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Introduction 
 
More writings about insurgency appeared in the last few years than in the preceding hundred years 
(Kilcullen 2008). The explosion of interest in the subject has much to do with international interventions: 
insurgency is the single most difficult and frightening challenge that an intervention—military or non-
military—may face. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, we define insurgency as an organized movement that uses armed 
violence to overthrow a country’s government while often hiding within the civilian population and 
using civilians to perform combat support functions. The use of civilian population differentiates 
insurgency from the regular warfare where such an exploitation of civilians would constitute a war 
crime. Similarly, a rebellion where anti-government forces do not disguise themselves as civilians and 
fight as a regular, identifiable military is different from insurgency. The significant involvement of civilian 
population also distinguishes insurgency from a purely terrorist movement, which relies primarily on a 
tight network of professional terrorists.  Although our definition, like any other (e.g., US DoD, 2007), 
leaves room for gray areas, it serves to emphasize the key feature of insurgency—its reliance upon, and 
exploitation of civilian population. Because the literature on modeling, simulation, and analysis of 
regular warfare is vast and readily available, and because insurgencies are often associated with 
interventions, in this paper we limit our discussion to insurgencies.  
 
Insurgency forces may include a combination of the following: 
 an ideology-based movement that fights to overthrow the current form of the country’s 
government and to establish a different regime;  
 a personality-based movement driven to install its leader as the ruler of the country;  
 a religious movement that wishes to defend its religious freedoms or to establish a religion-
based regime in the country;  
 an ethnic minority demanding greater rights or independence;  
 a regional movement demanding secession or a greater share of the country’s resources; 
 an ethnic majority fighting against the rule of an ethnic minority or a colonial power.  
 
Counterinsurgency forces also take a variety of forms: 
 a democratic state that enjoys the support of a majority of the population; 
 a dictatorship that relies on coercion to maintain its rule; 
 a colonial government that represents a foreign power; 
 a state that receives a limited support of a foreign power but is independent in its actions and 
could conceivably survive on its own; 
 a state largely reliant on resources and support of a foreign power.   
 
Regardless of the forces on the insurgent and counterinsurgent sides, importance and effectiveness of 
insurgencies have grown since the Second World War, for numerous reasons. These include the 
reluctance of Western or Western-supported governments to apply the brutal methods common in 
prior centuries; the effectiveness, low cost and ease of use of modern small arms like the Kalashnikov 
rifle (Singer ,2006); the easy availability of arms from a range of state and non-state supporters through 
channels of modern commerce (Anderson, 2007). 
 
An international intervention can be a response to an insurgency, either in support of the insurgent side, 
e.g., African Union peacekeeping in Darfur since 2004 (Lynch, 2007), or in support of the 
counterinsurgents (e.g., the US support to the Colombian government fighting the FARC insurgents 
[Marcella, 2003]). On the other hand, an international intervention is often a cause of an insurgency, or 
a major factor in changing the insurgency’s intensity or character. Thus, a change in insurgency can be 
both a cause and an effect of an intervention. 
 
For example, a diplomatic intervention may induce a third party to discontinue its support to an 
insurgency; or compel a counterinsurgency-fighting government to conciliate with insurgents. An 
international famine aid or economic development assistance may reduce populations’ grievances and 
its support to insurgents; but it may also increase the resources available to insurgents through 
protection racket (Baker, 2009).  
 
Similarly, an international informational campaign that condemns an oppressive government may fan 
the flames of insurgency against the government; yet a campaign in support of a government may 
convince a part of the population that the government is an illegitimate foreign puppet. Finally, a 
military or law-enforcement intervention is likely to cause popular resentment at foreign meddling, or 
drive a segment of population to insurgency by depriving them of their prior privileges and wealth.     
 
In turn, insurgency affects other phenomena (Kott and Citrenbaum, 2010). Economic development 
suffers, and illicit economy flourishes. Political dynamics shifts toward the competing positions on the 
issue of how to fight or to accommodate the insurgency.  Information channels become key tools—and 
casualties—of insurgents and counterinsurgents. Crime and corruption multiply as all sides may resort 
to bribes, death threats, protection racket, drug revenue, ransom and extortions. Ethnic, social and 
religious divisions are exploited and magnified in an insurgency.   
  
Qualitative Theories and Models 
 
Theorists and practitioners of insurgency and counterinsurgency have outlined a number of key factors 
that affect the strengths of insurgency. Lenin (Osanka, 1962) stressed the importance of economic and 
social discontent of masses as a precondition to successful insurgency, as well as presence of a well-
organized core of revolutionaries able to mobilize and guide the insurgency. Lawrence (1920, 1935) 
emphasized the need for an insurgent base inaccessible to the counterinsurgents forces, with protective 
terrain, adequate supplies of munitions, and at least passively supportive population—a safe haven 
where insurgents can hide and regroup. He also noted that insurgents benefit when counterinsurgent 
force relies on a vulnerable technology, such as a railroad.  
Galula (1964) wrote about the critical role of civilian population who tends to be largely neutral in the 
conflict and shifts its support to insurgents or counterinsurgents depending on perceived benefits and 
outcomes of such a support. The population’s support also depends on the actions, such as assistance or 
violent reprisals, taken by either side toward the population.  Malayan insurgency (Nagl, 2002) offered 
the evidence that insurgency loses its strengths when population is physically separated and protected 
against the insurgents; when counterinsurgents offer economic benefits, security from violence, and 
political conciliation to the population. In addition, counterinsurgents benefit when they are able to 
attract a large fraction of population by exploiting ethnic and other differences. Indigenous 
counterinsurgent forces are more effective than foreign counterinsurgency forces in gaining 
population’s loyalty.  
Leites and Wolf (1970) point out that insurgency declines when deprived of resource inflows (such as 
munitions, supplies, and finances) and when its organizational structure and competency are disrupted 
by counterinsurgents. Respect and fear of government and its forces are important to dissuade 
population from supporting insurgents (Peters, 2006). War-weariness and anti-war sentiments among 
the counterinsurgent population and government may encourage and strengthen the insurgency 
(Iyengar and Monten, 2008;  Anderson, 2007). Amnesty, financial rewards and offers of government and 
military positions can induce insurgents to switch sides (Kahl, 2007). 
While the aforementioned factors are the most common drivers of insurgency, many other phenomena 
are important in specific situations. For example, a large pool of displaced persons or refugees can 
become a highly productive recruiting ground for insurgents as well as an opportunity to skim the 
foreign food aid (Cuny and Hill, 1999).  Large-scale international economic aid programs can become the 
primary financing mechanism for an insurgency, through protection racket (Baker, 2009).  
In an attempt to integrate a range of theoretical findings and practical observations, the US military 
produced a counterinsurgency manual (US Army, 2006), which is in part a comprehensive qualitative 
model of insurgency. The widely-cited manual identifies multiple factors that encourage and discourage 
insurgency, stresses that application of force can be a major factor in increasing population’s 
resentment of counterinsurgency, and highlights population’s security, good governance and essential 
services as key factors that diminish the population support to insurgency. 
Unfortunately, empirical support to qualitative theories of insurgency tends to be anecdotal rather than 
scientifically rigorous. The work by Iyengar and Monten (2008) is a relatively uncommon example of a 
model-based, quantitative examination of a qualitative theory. These authors test the argument that 
anti-war sentiments in the USA emboldens the anti-US insurgents in Iraq and influences them to 
increase the rate of attacks on the US forces. Iyengar and Monten construct a theoretical model that 
relates the behavior of Iraq insurgents, specifically the rate of attacks on US forces and on Iraqi 
Government forces, to their perception of anti-war sentiments in the US. In this model, insurgents are 
rational, strategic actors who attempt to optimize the distribution of their attacks over time in such a 
manner that the insurgents preserve their resources while maximizing the anti-war opinions in the US. 
The authors compute the differences in predictions of the model for different areas of Iraq—some with 
greater access to information about the US public opinions than others—and compare these estimates 
with the reported insurgent attacks.  They find that in periods immediately after the US media reports a 
spike in anti-war sentiments, the level of insurgent attacks increases.     
Also unfortunately, interpretation and application of qualitative models to practical decision-making is 
an imprecise art. When in 2007-2007 the US decision-makers pondered whether to increase or to 
decrease the number of US troops of Iraq—the so-called Surge decision (Woodward, 2008)—the 
qualitative theory was hardly in question. Most likely, all participants in the debate agreed that 
increasing the number of US troops fighting the Iraqi insurgency may improve the security for a fraction 
of the Iraqi population; it may also increase the population’s anger at foreign occupation; it may also 
give the Iraqi government additional time to strengthen its political and military posture; or, it may also 
lull the government into complacent reliance on the US protection. However, the decision-makers and 
consultants disagreed strongly on the relative quantitative magnitudes of these potential qualitative 
effects, and on the resulting balance.   
The overwhelming majority of the US senior military leaders believed that on the balance the Surge—
rapid temporary injection of additional US troops into the counterinsurgency efforts—would be counter-
productive because it would merely encourage the Iraqi government to continue its complacent 
dependency on the US (Woodward, 2008; pp.224-281). A small group of civilian theoreticians and 
retired generals believed otherwise and urged President George W. Bush to accept the Surge plan.  
In the event, President Bush decided to execute the Surge, and a major reduction of insurgency followed 
a few months later, in the middle of 2008. Opinions still differ on whether the Surge worked as its 
proponents expected, or whether other, unrelated mechanisms caused the reduction in insurgency 
(Woodward 2008; pp.380-384; Pierson 2008).  Qualitative models are insufficient to answer such 
questions; they require quantitative models with the corresponding quantitative metrics, variables, and 
relationships.  
Quantitative Measures of Insurgency 
 
To construct quantitative model of a complex phenomenon, such as insurgency, one needs ways to 
measure attributes and dynamics pertaining to that phenomenon. Formulating meaningful metrics of 
insurgency, however, is a significant challenge. Insurgencies are largely about human perceptions, which 
are contextual. For example, public opinion about the quality of current situation in a country is highly 
dependent on past historical experiences and availability of alternatives. Thus, interpretation of a 
metric’s magnitude or event its trend is dependent on other, often intangible variables (Campbell et al, 
2009).  
Most commonly used metrics of insurgency measure level of violence, e.g., the number of insurgent 
attacks per month; quality of government institutions, e.g., public opinion polls regarding the level of 
corruption; and strengths of security forces, e.g., the number of counterinsurgent troops and their 
degree of readiness. For example, Brookings Institution offers comprehensive datasets of metrics 
(O’Hanlon and Campbell; Campbell and Shapiro) for insurgencies in Iraq (since March 2003) and 
Afghansistan (since October 2001). These datasets include several dozens of metrics such as fatalities 
and counterinsurgent troops, number of insurgent attacks of different types, strength of 
counterinsurgent troops, strengths of anti-insurgent militia, unemployment, electricity generation, 
inflation, GDP, and public opinion polls.  
Others begin to explore more comprehensive processes of measuring insurgency, with a special focus on 
the insurgency’s less-tangible aspects like population attitudes and perceptions. For example, the MPICE 
program (Dziedzic, 2008) has developed a broad-ranging recommendation for gathering a variety of in-
depth metrics with computer tools. These would include semi-automated analysis of a country’s media 
content to gauge popular and elite impressions of insurgency-related issues; creation of a panel of 
experts to assess issues of interest (e.g. the capacity of law enforcement agencies to perform essential 
functions); and specially constructed public opinion surveys. 
There is no shortage of complaints about metrics being potentially meaningless and even misleading. 
For example, Clancy and Crosett (2007) describe history of several insurgencies and find that metrics 
used in those insurgencies were highly misleading. Still, critics of metrics agree that analysts and 
decision-makers must look for insightful metrics, and for better means to interpret their meaning. 
Quantitative models can help do exactly that.   
 
Influence Diagrams 
 
Also called the causal loop diagram, influence diagram occupies the middle ground between a 
qualitative model and a quantitative model. Like a qualitative model, an influence diagram describes key 
aspects of insurgency phenomena and the influences between them. In addition, however, an influence 
diagram offers features that make it a stepping-stone toward a quantitative model: the diagram names 
specific quantitative variables, identifies dependent variables for each variable, and specifies whether an 
increase in a variable causes an increase or decrease in its dependent variable. 
 
 Figure 1. Key variables and their relations for the insurgency of Anglo-Irish War 1916-1923 
 
In Figure 1, the influence diagram shows key variables and their relations that describe the insurgency of 
Anglo-Irish War (also known as the Irish War of Independence) of 1916-1923 (Anderson, 2007). Let us 
begin with the variable called Number of Insurgents, which reflects the number of active anti-British 
insurgents operating in Ireland. An increase in Number of Insurgents leads to increase in Insurgent 
Attacks—note that the two variables are connected with an arrow and marked with the plus sign 
(increase leads to increase).  
 
The growing Number of Attacks in turn leads to an increase in British Public War-Weariness (again, the 
plus sign indicates that increase leads to an increase) and prompts the British forces in Ireland to 
energize their British Security Measures, which leads to greater Irish Population Resentment and also to 
more arrests that deplete the Number of Insurgents. Note the last arrow (from British Security Measures 
to Number of insurgents) is marked with a minus sign, because here increase leads to decrease. And so 
on.  
 
The diagram points to potentially very complex non-linear dynamics of insurgency. Even in this simple 
model, the number of Insurgent Attacks, for example, affects the Number of Insurgents in five different 
ways—there are five distinct paths from Insurgent Attacks to Number of Insurgents.  
The benefits of constructing such a diagram include the following: 
 The modeler or analyst elucidates and formalizes her thinking about the insurgency phenomena; 
 Specific variables and their relations are identified and documented; 
 Qualitative nature (e.g., increase in A leads to decrease in B) of the variable dependencies are 
determined and documented; 
 Complex feedback loops and side effects become clearly visible; 
 Subject matter experts and other analysts and modelers can review and confirm or question the 
visual representation of the model.  
 
Ideally, the modeler derives the influence diagram directly from relevant qualitative theories. For 
example, Pierson faithfully followed a single qualitative model--the Counterinsurgency Manual (US 
Army, 2006)--to build an influence diagram of Iraq insurgency (started in 2003), with a large number of 
variables and influence lines (Pierson, 2008).  
Choucri et al (2006) formulate their influence diagram of insurgency while rigorously documenting social 
science theoretical literature in support of each of their model’s influences. For example, instead of 
merely asserting as self-evident the influence “More Insurgents Lead to More Regime Opponents,” they 
cite literature that supports existence of such an influence. 
They also attempt to justify the validity of variables they introduce into their model. For example, they 
introduce a variable called State Resiliency and justify it by comparing the State Resiliency to the 
determinants of civil war of Hegre et al (2001).  
System Dynamics Models of Insurgency 
 
The modeler may continue to develop the model of Fig. 1 by specifying equations that relate each 
variable to the variables that influence it, e.g., the equation that computes the Number of Insurgents as 
a function of British Security Measures and of Irish Population Resentment. The resulting system of 
equations (typically a system of coupled non-linear differential equations) can be solved, for example, by 
numerical simulation. The solution will shows how each variable evolves over time. 
 System Dynamics (Sterman, 2001) is a technique that simplifies specifying and solving such systems of 
equations. A variable is represented as a “stock” of goods. Inflows and outflows represent temporal 
changes to the variable. A “valve” that opens and closes as a function of other variables controls the rate 
of a flow.  
 
 
Figure 2. A fragment of a System Dynamics model 
Fig. 2 depicts a fragment of a System Dynamics model that elaborates the influence diagram of Fig. 1. 
Here, the Number of Insurgents is a stock, or a level of liquid in a reservoir. The incoming pipe carries 
the flow of new recruits; the valve opens wider when the Irish Population Resentment is greater. One 
outgoing pipe represents the depletion of Number of Insurgents due to arrests. The valve opening on 
that pipe depends on the British Security Measures. The second outgoing pipe represents the number of 
insurgents lost in action, and the valve is controlled by the number of Insurgent Attacks. The modeler 
must specify an equation for each valve. A computerized System Dynamic tool such as (isee systems, 
2009) helps to specify the model and then solves it automatically.  
 
System Dynamics is arguably the most popular technique of insurgency modeling. For example, Fig. 1 is 
partially adapted from Anderson (2007) who constructed a system dynamics model of the Anglo-Irish 
War, possibly the first modern urban insurgency. Anderson used only a few causal loops—closed paths 
through a set of variables. One loop represents the insurgency suppression and creation: coercive acts 
of British forces increase interference in civil life, which increases population resentment, which 
increases number of insurgents and their anti-British attacks, which leads to increase in British coercive 
acts. Another critical loop reflects the impact of British war weariness: as insurgent violence increases, 
British public’s war-weariness increases, leading to the public pressure to remove British troops from 
Ireland. 
 
If Anderson (2007) exemplifies a high-level model capturing overall dynamics of the entire insurgency, 
the work of Grynkewich and Reifel (2006) is an example of a detailed model of a particular sub-feature 
of insurgency.  They model the financial operations and organizational behavior of the Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat (known by its French initials, GSPC). The model relates intensity of insurgent 
combat operations, expenses to support the operations, and influence of combat operations on 
population’s willingness to support insurgents financially.  
 
The key stock in this model is the pool of finances available to GSPC; key inflows include extortion from 
population, voluntary donations, smuggling operations, kidnappings and ransoms. Outflows include 
organizational overhead and operational costs. Authors use limited published data and educated 
guesses to derive values of equation parameters such as the fraction of population willing to donate to 
insurgents and the amount of donations. The authors report that the model’s simulations agree 
qualitatively with the available information regarding the GSPC’s operations and finances. 
 
 While few would claim that a system dynamics model of insurgency provides a reliable prediction of an 
insurgency’s future evolution, there are other significant benefits in constructing and simulating such a 
model: 
 The model helps analysts and decision-makers see un-anticipated side effects, particularly those 
due to feedback loops;  
 The modelers and analysts document systematically a formal model that includes a rich, 
integrated set of factors, processes, and quantitative dependencies;  
 The simulation of the model illustrates the complexity of the nonlinear temporal dynamics of 
the insurgency system;  
 Sensitivity analysis aids analysts and decision-makers in forming insights and intuition toward 
formulation of intervention plans and policies.  
 
 
Agent Based Modeling of Insurgency 
 
Let us return to Fig. 1. Even in this simple diagram, we see several distinct actors, each with its own set 
of goals, actions, culture, resources, and relations: insurgent organization, general Irish public, British 
forces in Ireland, British public and British government. We may conclude that this set of actors (agents) 
is too simplistic: after all, Irish insurgents included various movements with different tactics and 
leadership, the British public included pro-war and anti-war segments, and the British government 
included parties with different views on the Irish question, and so on.  
If we wish to model the dynamic relations and mutual influences of all these agents, we should add 
multiple variables associated with each of the agents, and influence lines between the additional 
variables. The model becomes unwieldy. 
An alternative is to use the agent-based modeling paradigm. An agent-based model consists of agents – 
software representations of individuals or groups of individuals. Groups can be represented at different 
scales of abstraction: organizations, segments of populations, ethnic or religious groups, social classes, 
political parties, or movements, even whole countries. 
A model may also include elements of the agents’ environment. For example, we may want to represent 
significant geographic areas where the insurgency unfolded: Dublin, Southern Ireland, Northern Ireland, 
etc.  
An agent has attributes, e.g., an insurgent organization may be characterized by the number of 
members, amount of munitions, funds available, level of combat training, political objectives, and 
organizational competency. An agent has relations to other agents, e.g., an insurgent group may be an 
ally of another insurgent group.  
An agent has means by which to make decisions about the actions it will take. Computationally, agents 
can be implemented, for example, as objects. In that case, an agent has methods by which it makes 
decision, i.e., choices among available actions. Such a method may include rules or decision-making 
algorithms, stochastic or deterministic. 
An agent has a set of actions it can take, e.g., bombing the barracks of counterinsurgent forces, moving 
itself to another county, or adopting a more positive attitude toward a rival insurgent group. When 
executed, an action affects attributes and relations of this and other agents. For example, a bombing 
attack by an insurgent group reduces the strength and tolerance level of counterinsurgent agent, 
reduces the amount of explosives available to the insurgent group, and increases its morale and 
reputation for effectiveness.   
To construct a complete model, the modeler identifies the appropriate set of agents (possibly starting 
with an influence diagram like Fig. 1), assigns attributes and relations for agents, and codes the methods 
for agent decision-making and for action impacts. Prior to executing the simulation of the model, the 
modeler also assigns initial values (i.e., the values at the start of the simulation) of the attributes and 
relations.  
The simulation of the model usually proceeds in time-steps. A time-step for modeling insurgency is often 
a month or a week. At the beginning of the simulation, at week-1, each agent uses its decision-making 
method to select one or more actions. Then each agent executes the selected actions and each action 
modifies values of appropriate attributes. This completes the first time-step, and the process repeats for 
the next time-step, week-2, and so on. Because attributes and relations of agents change with time, in 
each time-step agents may select different actions (or no action).  
The simulation ends when agents reach the last time-step. Usually, the analyst who uses the model 
specifies the number of time-steps. For example, if the analyst studies the potential insurgency effects 
of an intervention campaign that is to last five years, she may specify 60 time-steps, with each step 
corresponding to a month of time.  
At the end of the simulation, the analyst reviews the history of the simulated agents: changes in their 
attributes and relations over time. For example, an analyst may observe that an agent representing an 
insurgent group rapidly increases its strength between months 1 and 15, then begins to lose support of 
local population between months 15 and 20, rapidly depletes its strengths between months 20 and 23, 
and finally merges with another insurgent group at month 27.  
Depending on the tool or model used, an agent may have a memory; it may accumulate experiences, 
learn new rules, and change its beliefs. For example, the CORES system (Kowalchuck et al, 2004) models 
an agent’s belief in its own actions. When an action does not succeed, the agent’s belief in the worth of 
the action diminishes. Thus, a counterinsurgency agent may gradually come to conclude that harsh 
retributions are not effective.  
Nexus (Duong, 2007) agent-modeling tool pays even greater attention to the cognitive nature of its 
agents. A Nexus agent has a degree of historical consciousness; it assigns and reassigns blame for past 
actions of agents, changes beliefs in trustworthiness of other agents, judges their ideology and looks for 
friendship with its enemy’s enemy. Nexus played a major role in a large-scale, real-world study by a US 
government agency, in a situation that involved potential international intervention and insurgency.  
Senturion’s agents possess a complex decision-making mechanism that comprises a set of algorithms 
drawn from game theory, decision theory, spatial bargaining, and microeconomics. Together, they 
model how agents interact in a political process. This tool has produced multiple real-world predictions 
of insurgency-driven situations, such as those in Iraq, Palestinian Territories, and Darfur in 2004-2009 
(Abdollahian, 2005; Sentia, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
  
Other Modeling Methods and Tools 
 
Broad overviews of tools relevant to insurgency modeling are found in (Hartley, 2008; Benedict and 
Simmons, 2007). Virtually all tools able to generate an anticipatory estimate of an intervention’s impact 
on insurgency fall into one of the two categories we already discussed: system dynamics modeling or 
agent-based modeling. However, one finds a few exceptions that fall into two other categories: human-
driven wargaming and statistical correlations. 
  
Human-in-the-Loop Wargaming 
PSOM model (Parkman, 2005) is an example of a wargaming-based approach—a computerized, time-
stepped war-game where human players decide the actions and moves of insurgent and 
counterinsurgent forces.  In PSOM, the geographic area of operations (the wargame board) is divided 
into 50 km squares. Each square has attributes such as its degree of urbanization, nature of terrain, 
population density, quality of infrastructure, cultural values, population’s perception of security and 
support to the government.  
 
Human players operate the insurgency and counterinsurgency forces. At the beginning of the wargame, 
the players allocate their respective force units to selected squares of the wargame board. Players 
assign particular missions to these force units: enforce, stabilize, disrupt, and others. During each time-
step, the computer determines the outcome of each force unit’s mission based on the current condition 
in the square, and on actions and strengths of the opponents’ forces in the square. The outcome then 
leads to changes in the square’s attributes values. For example, if the counterinsurgent force unit deems 
successful in its security-enhancement mission, the value of the security attribute in the square 
increases. Then the game proceeds to the next time-step, and so on.  
 
One can notice here a certain similarity to the agent-based modeling, except that in PSOM the human 
players select the agents’ actions (missions and moves), while in the agent-based paradigm agents make 
decisions without human intervention.  
 
Statistical Correlations 
Application of statistical techniques to historical data on insurgencies yields valuable correlations. Some 
regularity in data is noticeable even without a formal analysis. For example, (Quinlivan, 1997) offers a 
compelling visual correlation between an intervention’s success and the number of security personnel 
(military plus police) deployed per thousand of the country’s inhabitants. Historically, successful 
suppression of an insurgency requires about ten or more security personnel per thousand of population. 
 
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) offer a rigorous quantitative analysis of factors affecting the duration of 
civil wars (including insurgencies). They find that an external intervention tend to prolong a conflict. 
They also find a strong U-shaped correlation between the duration of an ethnically based conflict and 
the ethic fractionalization index. Conflict lasts longer in countries with two or few large ethnic groups 
than in those with many small groups or a single dominant group. 
 
  
    
Initialization, Calibration and Validation 
 
An insurgency model requires initial values of variables and values of constant parameters or 
coefficients in equations or rules. The modeler also needs a validation process that shows an acceptable 
degree of agreement between the model’s outputs and data or trends observed in the real insurgency. 
Often, modelers have to make educated guesses based on very limited data. E.g., Grynkewich and Reifel 
(2006) are compelled to use a single newspaper quote of an unnamed “Hezbollah operative” to assign a 
cost to an insurgent operation.  
When no insurgency-specific data are available, modelers resort to the use of data from domains 
partially similar to insurgency. For example, Robbins (2005) presents a system dynamics model for 
reconstruction and stabilization. The model includes an insurgency sub-module that accounts for such 
factors as ethnic fractionalization, effect of unemployment and urbanization. Lacking insurgency-related 
data, Robbins uses correlations obtained from studies of crime dynamics. 
Others derive quantitative parameters using rather sophisticated models, extensive collection of real-
world data and comprehensive statistical analysis.  For example, Iyengar and Monten use such 
formidable arsenal of tools to quantify the degree of influence that the apparent lack of resolve among 
the US public has on the intensity of insurgent attacks. 
In many cases, the modeler obtains a model’s parameters by calibration, i.e., by changing the values 
until the model’s outputs match the available data. For example, Leweling and Sieber (2006) calibrate 
their model of human resources of an insurgent organization against data derived from publically 
available news reports, such as numbers of insurgents arrested. They adjust both the structure and 
parameters of the model in order to obtain satisfactory agreement between the model’s output and the 
data.  
Although hardly the best practice, some modelers consider calibration identical with validation. The 
modeler calibrates the parameters of his model, shows a reasonable agreement between the model’s 
output and the available real-world data, and then declares the model valid. Ideally, he should calibrate 
with one set of data and validate with respect to another set data. Often, unfortunately, only one set of 
data is available.   
For example, Anderson (2007) validates his system dynamics model by comparing the model’s results 
with the data describing the Anglo-Irish War of 1916-23. He uses this particular civil war for validation 
purposes because it is the first modern urban insurgency, and because it is a rare case of a well-
documented insurgency. The model was able to replicate approximately the dynamic behavior of the 
Anglo-Irish War, suggesting a degree of model’s validity. Anderson lists numerous parameters and 
values of these parameters without explaining how he obtained the values. One has to presume that he 
calibrated the values in a way that maximized the agreement between the model results and the real-
world data. 
Case Study: Conflict in Northern Ireland, 1966-1998 
 
The Republic of Ireland occupies about 80% of the island of Ireland. The remaining northeastern area of 
the island, the Northern Ireland, is a part of the United Kingdom. Between 1966 and 1997, the Northern 
Ireland experienced an armed conflict known as the Troubles (Tonge, 2006). Several irregular combatant 
groups rooted in Irish Catholic population, notably the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional 
IRA) and the Official Irish Republican Army (Official IRA), fought for reunification of the Northern Ireland 
with the Republic of Ireland. Their opponents, irregular combatant groups of Protestant origins such as 
the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA), fought to maintain the Northern 
Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom. All irregular combatant groups were in conflict with the 
government of the United Kingdom and its armed forces. Because the irregular combatants disguised 
themselves as civilians and relied on widespread popular support, the conflict is best characterized as an 
insurgency.   
 
Political parties in the Northern Ireland were strongly polarized along the lines of ethno-religious 
affiliation. Pro-British Protestant parties included the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP). Supporters of these parties were more likely to sympathize with the UVF and UDA 
combatants. Irish Catholic population tended to support such parties as Social Democratic and Labor 
Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein. The last one is often described as the political arm of IRA, and Sinn Fein’s 
supporters were likely to assist IRA combatants (Silke, 1999).  
 
Let us review in detail a model (Grier et al, 2008) that focuses on the Troubles in Northern Ireland 
starting in 1968. The model is agent-based and uses a modeling tool called Simulation of Cultural 
Identities for Prediction of Reactions (SCIPR). Our objective in this modeling effort is to predict trends in 
the degree of population’s support to parties in this conflict. In effect, we ask the following question: if 
we were to have a model like this in 1969, could we predict trends in population’s sympathies to 
political movements like DUP and Sinn Fein. Arguably, insurgents on both sides draw their strength from 
population segments that identify with extremes of the political spectrum. If we can predict trends in 
extreme political opinions, we are better prepared to anticipate changes in the strength of insurgency. 
 
Another important question is how much data we need to construct and simulate such a model. Models 
that require less data are less expensive to construct, and easier to understand. In this case study, we 
use a rather simple model that requires little data. We find, encouragingly, that the simple model with a 
modest amount of readily available data produces potentially useful predictions of trends. 
 
Agents 
 
Using SCIPR, we construct about 5000 agents that represent the entire population of Northern Ireland. 
Each agent represents a group of approximately 300 individuals with approximately similar identities, 
residing near the same locale.  
 
An agent has several attributes including  
 the district of residence (one of the 26 districts),  
 ethno-religious affiliation (Catholic or Protestant),  
 a number between 0.0 and 1.0 representing the agent’s opinion on the issue of Northern Ireland 
affiliation (0.0 means Northern Ireland must remain British,  1.0 means Northern Ireland must 
unite with the Republic of Ireland), and  
 the political party that the agent supports. 
 
An agent has social links to an average of ten other agents, of which 90% are of the same religion. These 
networks are fixed and are formed under the assumption that individuals in Northern Ireland have 
around ten people that they are in regular contact with to discuss political issues, and that they are 
generally of a similar identity. Using these links, an agent can communicate its political opinion to other 
agents.    
 
There is no particular theoretical basis for using 5,000 agents, and not 500 or 50,000, but for simulations 
of less than 1,000 agents we find the statistical variance of the generated agent population from the 
input distributions is significant. With simulations greater than 5,000 there is no significant difference in 
either the initialization or outcome.  Therefore, the number 5,000 is merely a modeling assumption, and 
it seems to work for our purposes in this model. 
 
Note what we do not attempt to model: we do not model political movements explicitly, nor political 
leaders, nor other influential countries like the Eire or the United States, nor the rest of the Great 
Britain. Neither do we represent explicitly the insurgency groups, counterinsurgency forces, economics, 
and many other potentially significant factors.  
Agent Actions 
 
An agent can perform several actions:  
 
 communicate its current political opinion to another agent through an existing link we 
mentioned earlier, 
 change its political opinion on the question of Northern Ireland affiliation in response to 
receiving an opinion from another agent,  
 change its political opinion on the question of Northern Ireland affiliation in response to the 
news of a latest sectarian killing, and 
 change its party affiliation. 
 Figure 3. A model of an agent's change of its political opinion. 
An agent changes its political opinion in the manner depicted in Fig. 3. An agent’s opinion is 
characterized by the opinion number, e.g., 0.5, and the opinion’s confidence bounds, e.g., (0.25; 0.75).   
When the agent receives an opinion, .e.g., 0.7, from another agent within his social network (i.e., 
connected by an existing link), the receiver modifies its opinion partially, in the direction of the sender’s 
opinion. When the sender’s opinion is outside the receiver’s confidence bounds, the receiver ignores the 
sender’s opinion. This model, and the opinion scaling equations, follows largely (Friedkin, 1999; 
Hegselman and Krause 2002). 
 
An agent also changes its political opinion in response to events, in this case, the latest episode of 
sectarian killings. Responses to the event are specified by identities as a distribution of reactions to an 
opinion. After the occurrence of an event, agents within the region of the event sample a value from the 
distribution of reactions for their identities. This value is then used to scale the maximum opinion 
change parameter and added to an agent’s current opinion. This new opinion is then evaluated using 
the same bounded confidence procedure described above. In this model, when for example a Catholic is 
killed, agents of the same religion increase the strength of their opinion in favor of the united Ireland. 
 
An agent switches to support of another party when the agent finds its opinion more closely aligned 
with those of the members of another party than with the members of the agent’s current party. 
 
For the sake of clarity and brevity, we omit a few other relevant details, such as an agent’s change of 
opinion in response to a sectarian murder.  
 Model Initialization 
 
We initialize our model to resemble the Northern Ireland of 1968 by assigning each agent the values of 
its attributes. We pick the values stochastically but our distributions are such that the total numbers of 
Protestant and Catholic agents, as well as fractions of supporters of each party in each county 
correspond to the demographic and voting data of 1968 (Fig. 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Demographic and voting categories. 
We also create a social network of agents: we assign a link to a randomly chosen pair of agents in such a 
manner that each agent has on average about 10 links, with about 45% of the links connecting to agents 
within its immediate vicinity, 30% to other agents residing in the same district, and the rest---to agents 
in other locales of Northern Ireland. We also ensure that about 90% of the links are between agents of 
the same religion. These parameters—10, 45%, and 30%--are merely modeling assumptions, without a 
substantive empirical basis. A more rigorous modeling effort should consider obtaining empirical data to 
support and improve these assumptions. 
We also initialize a table of sectarian killings: for each day, how many (if any) Catholics and Protestants 
perish in inter-communal violence. Our model does not predict such data; they have to come from a 
separate source.  
Now we have the initial attributes of agents and their links fully defined; the model is ready for 
simulation. 
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Simulation Process 
 
The simulation algorithm begins its process on the first day of the year 1969, in simulated time. The 
algorithm randomly picks a number of pair of linked agents. In each pair, the algorithm randomly 
designates one of the agents to be the sender and another as the receiver of the political opinion. The 
number of pairs selected on each day is such that the every agent, on average, acts as a sender 
approximately every three days. This parameter—three days—is merely a modeling assumption; a more 
rigorous model should test the empirical validity of this assumption.  
 
When selected by the algorithm, the sender communicates its current political opinion to the receiver. 
The receiver then either ignores the received opinion, or shifts its own opinion partially toward the 
sender’s opinion as we discussed above. 
 
The simulation algorithm also notifies each agent of sectarian killings that occurred on that day. Agents 
adjust their political opinions correspondingly.  
 
The simulation algorithm then performs the same process on the next day of the simulated time, and so 
on. At the end of each year, each agent re-evaluates the alignment of its political opinion with the 
members of political parties. Depending on the alignment, the agent changes its party support. The 
algorithm stops at the end of the year 2005, as instructed by the modeler, and outputs the results. 
Results of the Simulation 
 
Fig . 5 and 6 compare the historical results of elections and polls in Northern Ireland with the results of 
our simulation.  
 Figure 5. Historical results of elections. 
 
Historical Elections
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
1969
1973
1974
1975
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1993
1996
1997
1999
2001
2004
2005
DUP
UUP
Other U.
APNI
Other Non
Other
Other N.
SDLP
SF
 Figure 6. Simulated results of elections. 
 
On the one hand, there is a notable similarity in general trends. For example, the simulated growth 
trends in the levels of support for Sin Fein post-1981 and for UUP in years 1973-1993 are broadly 
consistent with actual historical data.  The relatively constant levels of simulated support for DUP and 
SDL are also comparable to real history.  
On the other hand, the simulation clearly arrives to a steady state after1994 and seems unable to 
project any further changes. In our experience, this is a general limitation of the Bound Confident model 
which tends to converge to an artificial steady state after a period of simulation. 
The simulation also strongly overestimates the support to moderate parties, those between UUP and 
SDLP. Still, it is encouraging to see that an admittedly simple model shows the ability to predict trends in 
population’s sympathies nearly 15 years forward! It is even more remarkable considering that the 
modelers used very small amount of readily available information: elections results and basic 
demographics. 
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As of this writing, extended models of this type, e.g., (Kott and Corpac, 2007; Kott et al, 2007; Kott et al, 
2010) are used to study practical problems of modern insurgencies. 
Practical Tips 
 
 Insurgencies are diverse, and no ready-made model will represent all features of the particular 
insurgency and situation that interest your customer (here, customer is the organization that 
wishes to use the results of your analysis for applied decision-making). When selecting a model 
for your analysis, look for one that allows you to make major extensions and modifications.  
 A number of simple yet insightful models of insurgency have been published by academic 
researchers such as the Center for Contemporary Conflict of the Naval Postgraduate School 
(http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/). Consider using one of such models as an initial 
baseline, then experiment and gradually extend it for your purposes. 
 The ability to trace the chain of influences in analyzing results of a simulation is critically 
important. System Dynamics models tend to be better in this respect. 
 A modeler with little experience in insurgency modeling will find System Dynamics models 
easier to construct, to understand, and to debug. 
 Many insurgencies, and many strategies for managing insurgencies, cannot be properly modeled 
without representing multiple players—individuals and groups—in the insurgency. In such cases, 
an agent-based model is most appropriate.  
 Always model international actors’ influences on insurgents and counterinsurgents. Few 
insurgencies ever unfold without a major impact by one or more international participant. 
 Before constructing a model, ask your analysis’s customer about the actions her organization 
considers taking with respect to the insurgency, or within an insurgency-plagued region. Make 
sure your model is capable of representing those actions and their effects. 
 For every action your customer plans to take, include modeling of undesirable side-effects. Thus, 
if the analysis’ customer plans to provide food aid to refugees, include in your model a possible 
diversion of food by insurgents.      
 In selecting variables and attributes for your model, give preference to most tangible and 
measurable ones. Include the metrics that your customer expects to use or to affect. Also, 
consider including historical or current data available to you for calibration and validation. 
 Allocate adequate time and resources to review and improve your model with Subject Matter 
Experts (SMEs). Produce model’s visualizations specifically designed for easy comprehension by 
SMEs. 
 Insurgencies are emotional topics, and SMEs tend to hold strong, passionate opinions.  
Collaborate with several SMEs and welcome widely divergent views. Try to find SMEs who had 
experiences on both sides of an insurgency.   
 Early in the modeling project, work with insurgency SMEs to create a set of test cases. Ask 
several SMEs, independently, to produce their estimates of probable evolution of the insurgency 
in each case. Expect to receive widely divergent estimates.  
 
Resources 
 
Conflict Analysis Resource Center 
http://www.cerac.org.co/datasets.htm 
Pointers to multiple depositories of datasets related to armed conflicts, inlcuding insurgencies 
 
Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War Project 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/publicdata/publicdata.html 
data relating ethnic fractionalization and insurgency 
 
The American Political Science Association, Task Force on Political Violence and Terrorism 
http://www.apsanet.org/content_29436.cfm 
Pointers to multiple depositories of datasets related to political violence, inlcuding insurgencies 
 
David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, "War by Other means," RAND Publication 2008 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595.2/ 
Appendices A and B provide data and analysis of outcomes and correlations for 89 insurgencies, and 
data on counterinsurgency capabilities of world states and organizations 
 
Political Instability Task Force 
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfdata.htm 
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfpset.htm 
Multiple datasets related to internal wars, including insurgencies 
 
Minorities at Risk Data 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp 
Datasets characterizing multiple minorities, their conditions and potential risks, including potential or 
ongoing insurgency 
 
Genocide and Politicide project 
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/genocide/ 
Data describing cases of genocide, many related to insurgencies 
 
War and Health website 
http://warandhealth.com/civilian-victims-in-an-asymmetrical-conflict-data/ 
Civilian victims in an asymmetrical conflict 
 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
Armed Conflict and Intervention (ACI) Datasets 
 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/ 
multiple datasets on state instability and conflict 
 
Correlates of War Project (COW) 
http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/dataset.html  
 
Wolrd Bank Datasets 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTCONFLICT/0,
,contentMDK:20336174~menuPK:637270~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:477960,00.html 
Data on civil wars post-WWII 
 
Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) at 
Carnegie Mellon University. URL: 
http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/computational_tools/tools.html 
Listings and/ or repositories of software tools and libraries 
 
International Network for Social Network Analysis (INSNA). URL: 
http://www.insna.org/software/index.html 
Listings and/ or repositories of software tools and libraries 
 
Network Workbench (NWB) Tool 
https://nwb.slis.indiana.edu/community/?n=Main.NWBTool 
network analysis, modeling, and visualization toolkit  
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